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The positionality of the researcher has long been of debate. Within ethnographic 
research into cultural practices, a world of nuance arises in the possible relationships 
of researcher and researched. We are engaged in complex processes of reconciliation 
between the under-represented communities whose stories we aim to tell (Shaw 
1999: 108; Orsi 2013: 5), and the power an academic position confers to “define reality 
for others” (Hufford 1999: 298). The resulting implications for the researcher are 
further complicated and enriched when public interest in our work is mediated in 
online environments. As scholars we are often ill-equipped to ride fast-moving flows 
of misinformation and meme, rumour and trolling. 
  
Towards the end of my doctoral research, an academic term from my thesis became 
caught up in the increasingly heated spaces of yoga-related social media. In this 
article, I step back from the situation to share a snapshot of what happens when 
academics go viral, and to deconstruct the little-understood processes of subcultural 
evolution at work. I ask: what can we learn from these encounters about the nature of 
boundaries between scholar and practitioner, researcher and researched, professional 
and personal? And how might academic discourse and engagement evolve to meet 

















Towards the end of my doctorate, an academic term that I originated within 
my research into contemporary yoga communities began to be used in the 
affect-laden spaces of yoga-related social media. The rigours of academic 
research do not, on their own, adequately equip scholars for riding fast-
moving currents of misinformation and meme, rumour and trolling. This is 
further illustrated when we attempt, as I do here, to write about trolling and 
its discursive context for peer review. Proper referencing of sources within 
social media newsfeeds is difficult at best. Data analysis is dependent on 




On March 10th, 2018, an image was shared in various yoga-related Facebook 
groups. The faces of myself and two other people had been inserted into an 
existing photo, showing us wearing robes commonly associated with the 
Hindu priesthood. The brand logo of Yoga Alliance (see 2019i), had been 
added, together with the caption: “Authentic neoliberal yoga at Yoga 
Alliance!”  
 
Small numbers of social media activists claim that Yoga Alliance seeks to 
‘control’ the teaching of yoga, and that its managing ethos is appropriative of 
Indian wisdom traditions (see 2019a). This critique spreads from the 
organisation, to its staff and any public figures associated with it. My 
colleagues in the remixed image were Carol Horton, a writer and scholar on 
contemporary yoga (Horton and Harvey, 2012), and Matthew Remski, who is 
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most well-known for investigating abusive power dynamics in yoga (Remski, 
2019)1. In February 2018, we were among approximately one hundred 
scholars, teachers and activists who were asked by Yoga Alliance to give our 
opinions on proposed new teaching standards (see 2018). 
 
Shortly before this image was posted, similar photos had been shared and 
widely condemned in yoga-related social media spaces. Those unaltered 
photos showed a white Sanskrit scholar in the robes of a Hindu priest, leading 
a Vedic ritual with his students (see Cole, 2017). It was unclear whether the 
scholar was conducting a classroom demonstration, or undertaking the ritual 
as a priest. I and the others included in the remixed image had no connection 
to the earlier event or the scholar involved. Yet the new image was an attempt 
to associate us with an event widely held to be appropriative of Indian 
culture. The image suggests that Yoga Alliance’s consultants are not a 
collection of independent figures chosen for their diversity of thought, but an 
organised collective attempting to appropriate Indian culture to our combined 
commercial advantage. A research article could be written on this image 
alone. Yet a year later, much of the subcultural context that it references, and 
the numerous responses accreting to it, are lost in the data tide of social 
media.  
 
Engaging with yoga subcultures through social media was not central to my 
data collection, but it was a significant aspect of understanding the wider 
cultural context. I manage a blog (see Wildcroft, 2019b), a research related 
mailing list (see Wildcroft, 2019a), and guest appearances on podcasts (see 
Asimos, 2018) in order to regularly ‘reach’ a few thousand yoga teachers 
worldwide, employing common social media strategies for scholars. Through 
this reach, I test theoretical concepts such as the label ‘post-lineage yoga’ with 
publics beyond my original research, and construct pathways to impact and 
engagement, employing the terminology of academic funding metrics.  
 
The data I reference in this article is often autoethnographic, and ephemeral, 
yet the patterns of behaviour involved are clear. My positionality is unusual 
for a research journal, in discussing engagement outcomes rather than 
research outputs. I illuminate processes that are rarely addressed within 
scholarship, in order to ask: what can we learn from these encounters about 
the nature of interactions between scholar and practitioner, researcher and 
researched in the study of religion?  
 
Post-lineage and the governance of yoga 
 
My thesis centred on a specific community of yoga teachers in the UK 
(Wildcroft, 2018b). This yoga can be described as post-lineage in the same 
way that Linda Woodhead (1993) once described “post Christian” religious 
communities as engaging in direct, detailed responses to perceived issues 
 
1 Both colleagues are aware of, and have given consent for, their inclusion in this 
article. 
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with the existing institutions of Christianity. Whilst individual practitioners 
may maintain close connections to their original teachers, post-lineage yoga is 
a re-evaluation of the authority to determine practice, and a privileging of 
peer networks over pedagogical hierarchies, or saṃghas (communities) over 
guru-śiṣya (teacher-adept) relationships.  
 
The processes that my thesis describes are part of an increasingly visible, 
transnational evolution, in reaction to both orthopraxic yoga lineages, and 
more recent neoliberal yoga brands. Like any similar academic endeavour, 
my work describes instead of justifies the phenomenon of post-lineage yoga. 
But from its inception, yoga teachers have experimented with ‘post-lineage 
yoga’ as a self-descriptor. It was first used publicly by J Brown (see 2017a, 
Brown, 2017b), discussed with David Lipsius of Yoga Alliance (see Lipsius 
and Wildcroft, 2018), and referenced by Peter Blackaby (2018), among 
numerous others.  
 
Although the teaching of yoga is largely unregulated, there exists in many 
countries one or more bureaucratic organisations that cross lineage 
boundaries, and are diversely involved in creating common standards, 
ratifying training, and engaging with public policy structures on behalf of 
their members. In the UK, these include the British Wheel of Yoga (see 2015), 
Yoga Alliance Professionals (see 2019g)(no relation to Yoga Alliance) and the 
Independent Yoga Network (see 2019b). In North America and most of the 
world, the most prominent such organisation is Yoga Alliance. Founded in 
1999 as “a voluntary registry to recognize yoga teachers and schools” whose 
training met internally agreed standards (2019h), in recent years the 
expectations of its members have greatly increased. Many now expect the 
organisation to police ethical transgressions among members, yet others are 
vehemently opposed to any such regulation.  
 
Yoga Alliance is redrawing its standards for teaching yoga in order to address 
this conflict through extensive consultation, but some activists consider the 
consultation itself to be indicative of Yoga Alliance reaching beyond its 
mandate. A similar crisis in authority affects many membership-based yoga 
organisations. Here in Britain, the British Wheel of Yoga attempted to create 
national standards for yoga teaching, provoking significant criticism from the 
wider yoga teaching community (see Yates, 2016, Yoga Alliance Professionals, 
2016), and contributing to the resignation of its own chair (see BWY, 2018).  
 
Anti-governance activism in yoga includes many voices, such as J Brown 
(2018), who oppose the bureaucratic control of yoga teaching in any form. But 
the most vocal of opponents seek instead a return to the competing lineage 
orthodoxies that dominated the twentieth century teaching of yoga. Such 
modern, transnational lineage structures evolved from very different pre-
modern processes of teaching yoga, yet are now positioned as the guardians 
of Indian heritage by those who call themselves yoga traditionalists 
(Wildcroft, 2018b). In contrast to lineage structures, all cross-lineage peer 
networks are considered by some activists to be culturally appropriative.  




For many who have become uncomfortable with self-definitions grounded in 
an institutional identity, the label of post-lineage yoga is an opportunity to 
discover themselves as part of an apparent revolution beyond their 
immediate community of practice. For those most threatened by the 
recognition of any yoga subculture with grassroots approaches to recognising 
authority however, the term is immediately threatening. On social media, any 
discussions that centre around the evolution of yoga gather significant levels 
of vitriol and misinformation. 
 
In my own case, within less than a week of being listed on the Yoga Alliance 
website as part of the standards review project, the term ‘post-lineage yoga’ 
was included in ever-widening circles of defamation. My research had 
unexpectedly become subject to a very different kind of ‘impact and 
engagement’ from that envisaged by the ideals of the Research Excellence 
Framework (see 2019d). The definition of post-lineage yoga was 
misrepresented as white supremacist, and naming as academic description 
and approval were deliberately conflated (see Timbers, 2018b). Some claimed 
that I advocated for, or even founded ‘Post Lineage Yoga’ (sic) as a brand. 
Citation and copyright were also confused, with the accusation that my 
attempts to clarify my own descriptor were an attempt to ‘own’ the practice 
itself. Multiple commenters even claimed that they invented the term: 
 
People are trying to trademark ‘post-lineage’ like it’s unique. The sweetest 
thing is that they are complaining about my not citing their apparently 
proprietary term…while not citing me. (In the comment thread of Jamison, 
2018) 
 
There was no record on the internet, nor in published scholarship, of the term 
‘post-lineage’ existing prior to my work. Following consultation with senior 
colleagues, and without responding to specific examples of misinformation 
directly, on 9th March 2018, I made a post to Facebook and my own blog, 
addressing three points. Firstly, I informed readers that an academic 
description of post-lineage yoga does not equate to approval. Secondly, I 
clarified the definition of post-lineage yoga as neither anti-lineage nor anti-
tradition. Lastly, I asked that I be cited correctly when possible (Wildcroft, 
2018c). It did little to reclaim the ongoing narrative, strongly suggesting that 
my accusers were not mistaken, but were deliberately promoting 
misinformation.  
 
As far as can be determined, their aim was to discredit any Yoga Alliance 
consultants who were followed by large numbers of yoga teachers on social 
media, and who were not subject to the legal protections common to large 
organisations. This kind of hostile response to academic engagement activities 
is extremely difficult to predict in advance, and increasingly so in social 
media spaces. But even when anticipated, the standard institutional process 
for managing controversial research is to embargo publication, and restrict 
access to the results of the research. This disadvantages such research within 
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the REF requirements, and in my own case, would have restricted public and 
policy access to important and relevant research. In sum, it is difficult to 
conceive of a strategy for engaging yoga communities in research outputs 
such as this which would be immune from possible hostile responses. 
 
Yoga and Hindu nationalism 
 
A month before this, on 27th January 2018, Matthew Remski was due to visit 
the UK, and he and I had arranged to discuss our respective research in 
progress at a small private event.  A few days before the event, an invitation 
was requested from the Facebook account of a British Hindu nationalist who 
had frequently attacked Remski, myself and others on social media (Sharma, 
2018b). Instead, Remski offered to meet him in a more public debate. That 
invitation was refused, and our accuser informed us in Facebook comments 
that we were culturally appropriating yoga, because our private event would 
lack “Indian representation”. I responded that among the attendees were at 
least one person of Indian heritage, and one non-resident Indian national. 
Despite this, I was later accused in multiple threads and blog posts of banning 
Indians from my engagement events, a lie knowingly repeated by others: 
 
I find it sad that people like Remski and Wildcroft deny people of Indian 
descent who request to attend their classes and lectures. Because that would 
mean they would have be questioned for following a White supremacist 
playbook of usurping another culture’s knowledge and tradition in turn for 
profit. (Timbers, 2018a) 
 
This interaction marked the escalation of accusations against myself and other 
consultants by a small group of Hindu nationalists, based mostly in North 
America and Britain. Hindu nationalists espousing a far-right agenda are 
frequently found in unlikely alliances with liberal North American activists in 
yoga-related social media (McCartney, 2019, Jain, 2018). They collectively 
agree that all research into any form of yoga by non-Indians is a form of 
cultural imperialism. Under attack by influential and often wealthy 
individuals is the status of all etic religious studies research (Jain, 2014). This 
includes the aforementioned British Hindu nationalist, who is connected not 
only to far-right Indian politicians, but both far-right figures and 
Conservative politicians in Britain (Dawkins, 2017). Speaking of both 
historical Indology and the contemporary study of religion, he writes: 
 
What useful purpose does a Yoga scholar or a Yoga historian actually serve? 
If one wanted to learn differential calculus one would seek out a 
mathematician not a ‘Maths historian’ and with humility and respect ask to 
be taught. In the world of Occidental Yoga there seems to be a plague of 
‘Yoga Academics’. (Sharma, 2018a) 
 
Yoga Studies as a sub-discipline is uniquely vulnerable to a growing anti-
intellectualism in social media discourse. As the product of complex 
encounters between India and the rest of the world, yoga is a term that 
encompasses: a physical and mental practice for health and wellbeing; a 
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metaphysical system describing the ongoing creation of the universe; a 
devotional, ritual practice (Newcombe, 2013), and a system of ethics and other 
social practices for righteous living. Increasingly, for some Hindu nationalists, 
yoga also denotes a narrowly Vedantic form of Hindu theology (McCartney, 
2019). And whilst Hindu nationalism as a political movement is diverse 
(Beckerlegge, 2011), Hindu nationalist discourse on social media repeatedly 
blurs semantic boundaries concerning yoga practices, Vedantic philosophy 
and Indian politics until scholars who research the history of postural practice 
or Hindu philosophical traditions, are accused of appropriating the ineffable 
practices of a historically oppressed religious culture (Beckerlegge, 2011, 
India, 2014, Singleton, 2016). As one anonymous scholar wrote in a private 
email: 
 
I am not saying there is some watertight conspiracy here, but I do think there 
is a convergence of forces that will […] make it very difficult for others of us 
who want to write and speak on the same basic set of issues to do so safely. 
 
On yoga-related social media the nationalist discourse is coherent, narrowly 
focused, and hostile not only to scholarship, but to the ideal of consensus 
truth that defines academic peer review. As Nanda writes: 
 
So how can people be made to believe in something regardless of what the 
evidence says, and still maintain the fiction of an open public sphere? […] 
extend the “right” to the people to construct their own truths, by their own 
lights, while denying the very possibility of objective facts (Nanda, 2005) 
 
Such issues are far from exclusive to yoga-related social media. With a few 
exceptions (such as Hendricks and Vestergaard, 2019), significant scholarship 
on the rise of strategic misinformation online has yet to emerge, but as Jane 
reminds us: “contemporary netiquette not only tolerates—but often expects—
internet interlocutors to reach for a hyperbolic rape, torture, or death threat 
the moment they disagree” (Jane, 2015). ‘Fake news’ is an accusatory term 
increasingly used in misinformation itself (Ross and Rivers, 2018). 
Furthermore, as Jane writes:  
 
the scholarly attention given to [such] discourse […] has been diminishing at 
a time when the realworld circulation of online hostility has been markedly 
increasing. One possible explanation is that e-bile is metaphorically 
‘unspeakable’ [falling] well outside the norms of what is usually considered 
‘civil’ academic discourse. (Jane, 2015).  
 
A fortnight of trolling behaviours 
 
A deliberate ambivalence surrounds the attitude of the creators of 
misinformation towards the narratives they repeat. In my own case, it is 
impossible to ascertain if my accusers truly believe me to be a white 
supremacist, although it is doubtful, given the available examples of my work 
online. But as a target, the discourse is not one that grants me a voice (Phillips, 
2015). My representation within it is as a caricature of all that is presumed to 
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be wrong in contemporary yoga. In-group humour and frequent changes in 
tone are commonly used to dehumanise and isolate intended targets. I am 
both and at the same time accused of taking my accusers too seriously, and 
the accusations not seriously enough. All these behaviours are consistent with 
Whitney Phillips’ descriptions of ‘trolling’ (Phillips, 2015). 
 
The timescales involved in online trolling proceed at a disorienting speed 
incompatible with the processes of traditional academic inquiry. In the early 
months of 2018, ‘post-lineage yoga’ was a niche term from an unpublished 
body of research. It became a commonly used term in less than a fortnight. By 
that point, some online comments were already demanding that I publish not 
just my research, but also an accompanying analysis of the appropriateness of 
the term for multiple North American yoga teaching subcultures. Elsewhere, 
deliberate misinformation by ten to twenty provocateurs had led to 
widespread confusion about where the term had originated.  
 
In one thread in ‘The Connected Yoga Teacher Group’, one person wrote: 
 
I first question if we’re in a ‘post-lineage’ age, considering lineage is available 
to us […]. (see Auder, 2019) 
 
In response another said: 
 
I could be misunderstanding the term, since I only heard it for the first time 
this week. Now it seems to be all over my Facebook feed 
 
The first responded: 
 
I believe it was recently coined by Remski or Wildcroft, to refer to a particular 
approach, but I’m not sure if it’s an accurate or precise term 
 
Nine more comments discussing the term followed. Within hours of the first, I 
had responded with an explanatory graphic, and a full citation, receiving 
passing gratitude in return. To conclude the thread, the first commentator 
returned to make the dubious claim that she had not been able to ask me, or 
tag me directly into the conversation “for some reason”, even though she had 
previously added me as a Facebook friend specifically in order to follow my 
research.  
 
For the following fortnight, I discovered numerous such comment threads 
that demonstrated a spectrum of affect from the curious, to the combative. It 
is plausible to assume that many more such threads passed beneath my 
notice. Without intervention, and most commonly, ‘post-lineage yoga’ was 
redefined as a perspective that was antagonistic to both lineage, and the 
Indian origins of yoga. As a scholarly term, ‘post-lineage yoga’ addresses the 
common and imprecise division between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ yoga. 
Online, the term was retrofitted to reinforce that same artificial division, with 
‘post-lineage’ being used to describe any ‘non-traditional’ yoga. Any 
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reluctance or delay on my part to produce accessible answering commentary 
in forums happening largely without my knowledge, was treated as a breach 
of the consensus ethics of social media space. Some groups of yoga teachers 
online even agreed that as ‘post-lineage’ was now part of the subcultural 
repertoire, they had the right to use, define and redefine the term at will.  
 
Evidence strongly suggests that my work was not the true target of these 
online behaviours. Those who had seeded an already high-affect discourse 
about yoga teaching standards and practices with the term ‘post-lineage yoga’ 
demonstrated an active interest in distorting its definition to political ends. 
Their aim was to manufacture outrage, and by doing so discredit attempts by 
Yoga Alliance and other similar groups to create consensus standards for the 
teaching of yoga by their members. If the public reception and impact of an 
important yoga-related piece of scholarship was jeopardised as a result, this 
was only collateral damage.  
 
Groups, rebels and orthodoxies 
 
Much of the trolling behaviour within the subculture is coordinated in private 
Facebook groups. Private discussion groups are common within yoga-related 
social media. With such groups, non-members can visit a public ‘About’ page, 
and request membership, but not read any content posted within. Most public 
groups are considered to be combative, incoherent, or dominated by self-
promotion rather than discussion. Private groups are usually seeded by a 
small number of people. They may gather members at a rapid rate, but fall 
dormant as quickly. Knowing which spaces are currently active, and actively 
moderated in a way that feels like calm discussion is possible, takes a 
significant investment of time. Groups that become popular are targeted by 
small, semi-coordinated groups of online identities who seek to impose a 
fervent orthodoxy on such questions as what defines a ‘safe’ yoga practice, 
whether specific innovations in practice are ‘true’ yoga or not, and what 
counts as ‘cultural appropriation’ in yoga (for examples of this debate in 
online news media see Johnson and Ahuja, 2016, Pells, 2015). As a result, what 
appears to be the group consensus of hundreds of members may in fact be 
dominated by the posts and comments of ten or less. Apart from the 
aforementioned Hindu nationalist voices, the vast majority of these identities 
appear to be white and North American.  
 
Most group moderators ban those exhibiting the most consistent trolling 
behaviours. Similarly, public figures who are consistently attacked by the 
same online identities will often block them. But for the trolls, the ban or block 
is proof not that their behaviour is offensive, but that they have spoken a truth 
that their targets are attempting to suppress.  
 
In a recent thread, one comment reads: 
 
I can’t see anything Matthew Remski posts here because he blocks anybody 
who disagrees with him. (In the comment thread of Auder, 2019) 




Similar comments follow, expressing pride in being blocked, employing 
insulting epithets and claiming personal knowledge of transgressive 
behaviour by Remski: 
 
He's a douche. He saw a window to write about this for $$. Folks don't know 
his dark side. Plain and simple...he sucks. 
 
The comments combine to form a moment of in-group solidarity characterised 
by a common repertoire of insults, accusations, and, significantly, in-group 
humour (Phillips, 2015). As each member of the blocked in-group adds 
another comment, the rest respond with either a ‘like’ or a ‘laughing’ reaction 
emoji. The number of commenters is small, but the shared narrative is 
consistent and affect-laden.  
 
The comments continue: 
 
I'll just add, since I too am blocked (as part of the nefarious TROLL brigade of 
his imagination)...Matthew Remski is a drunk thesaurus. He has the writing 
skills of a smart high schooler who thought it was cool to get high and write 
stuff […] My goal here is to make sure as many ppl as possible associate the 
phrase "drunk thesaurus" with MR. 
 
By this process of small-group consensus, trolls ridicule public figures in 
yoga-related social media for being unprofessional, unscientific, unspiritual, 
‘unyogic’ (McCartney, 2019) or culturally appropriative. The targets include 
not just those who investigate contemporary practice, but also those whose 
work challenges an increasingly compromised subcultural orthodoxy 
(Wildcroft, 2018b), and those who manage post-lineage spaces, online or off. 
The motives, ethics, and research practices of writers such as yoga historian 
Mark Singleton (2016) and science journalist William Broad (2013) are 
routinely criticised in yoga-related social media discourse, and trolls seed 
those debates with misinformation. Trolls also use the moderators of social 
media as proxies for any regulation of yoga discourse. Yoga-related social 
media groups that admit the possibility of teaching and sharing yoga 
knowledge outside of lineage hierarchies are thus equally declared to be 
guilty of ‘appropriating’ yoga, and their moderators are targeted. 
 
In some cases, a new private Facebook group will be created by the trolls 
themselves that parodies a group that has been targeted. The description that 
accompanies the group will describe it as ‘honest’ or some other euphemism 
for combative. After an outbreak of trolling behaviour and retaliatory bans in 
the ‘Yoga and Movement Research Community’ group (see 2019j), the main 
instigators of trolling threads created a number of parody groups, including: 
‘The Yoga Show’ group (see 2019l), and another group also called the ‘Yoga 
and Movement Research Community’ (see 2019k). ‘The Yoga Show’ group’s 
description, updated on 21st March 2018, reads: 
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A space to discuss the things that the other groups won't, in ways that the 
other groups prohibit […] You will undoubtedly see a great deal of 
lampooning, roasting, and bemoaning of yoga industry, sometimes resulting 
in heated debate. This is all part of the real life Yoga Show and can’t be 
avoided. (2019l) 
 
The public presence of the parody ‘Yoga and Movement Research 
Community’ group mostly makes jokes at the expense of the original group’s 
creator, Diane Bruni (see Bruni, 2018). But in the same week that the image 
discussed at the start of this article appeared, the group changed its public 
description to display the following messages: 
 
(9th March 2018): ’Post Lineage Yoga is my invention which combines White 
[sic] supremacy, colonial thought, and capitalistic branding’ Theodora 
Wildcroft, founder of PLY 
 
(9th March 2018): Glad we got your attention Matthew, Theo, and Carol. As 
long as you continue to contribute to White supremacy in yoga you shall be 
taunted a second time. Your mothers were all hamsters, and your fathers 
smelt of elderberries! 
 
(11th March 2018): If the only thing this group does is have people who think 
they dominate the Western yoga narrative to reflect that they are indeed 
supporting the triad of colonialist thought, capitalistic branding, and White 
supremacy in the yoga world, then mission accomplished. The onus is now 
on Matthew, Carol and Theo to show how they are not a part of this. Good 
luck with that! (2019k) 
 
The first description describes post-lineage yoga as a combination of white 
supremacy and capitalism, deliberately mimicking citation practices. It also 
claims that I am the founder of a yoga brand, rather than the creator of an 
academic descriptor.  
 
The second description expresses delight that the previous description has 
been noticed. Matthew Remski, and Carol Horton are, once again, added as 
targets. The description adds taunts lifted from the film Monty Python and the 
Holy Grail (Gilliam and Jones, 1975), in an attempt to add in-group humour. 
 
Between the three descriptions, the one-sided discourse moves from apparent 
citation, to joking taunt, to a challenge, to a final threat. That threat was 
confirmed elsewhere on Facebook, where a former member of ‘The Yoga 
Show’ group discussed the conversations happening behind the privacy wall: 
 
They want nothing but to see you all destroyed. […] If anyone spoke out, the 
pile on was swift and deadly. (In the comment thread of Remski, 2018). 
 
Reach, voice and ambivalence 
 
Returning to that last description, we find the convoluted turn of phrase: 
“people who think they dominate the Western yoga narrative”. Among the 
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accusations made against the consultants engaged by Yoga Alliance, the most 
consistent was that our opinions had been amplified over more deserving 
voices. Social media reach is considered by trolls to be a valuable resource 
that can be liberated, and pirated. Public figures are frequently asked to 
justify their numbers of followers by people who, by definition, also consider 
such figures important enough to engage with. As of 15th March 2019, my 
personal Facebook account has received ‘friend’ requests from two thousand 
yoga teachers with whom I have had no prior contact. My account is 
‘followed’ by over five hundred more (see 2019e). This is a side-effect of my 
research over which I have no intentional control. Matthew Remski’s personal 
account lists over five thousand followers (see 2019c). In contrast, the Boycott 
Yoga Alliance group page has gathered just over a thousand ‘likes’ to date. In 
comparison, Yoga Alliance currently has over 90,400 members (2019i).  
 
Trolls ‘tag’ the names of public figures with any significant reach, such as 
myself, because doing so increases their much smaller reach to include those 
who follow us. Although trolls only engage with public figures as “fetishized 
pawns in the trolls’ game” (Phillips, 2015), and consider any ban or block as a 
victory, they also commonly accuse their targets of refusing to engage in 
debate with them.2 Trolls employ such provocative arguments in part because 
there is so little incentive for any public figure to engage with a minority 
group arguing in bad faith. The proportion of these involved in actively 
trolling yoga-related social media spaces are vanishingly small. In March 
2018, myself and a small number of those targeted experimented with 
blocking thirty to forty of the worst online identities. As a direct consequence: 
trolling largely disappeared from our social media feeds and trolls cannot use 
tags to gain direct access to our audience. Nonetheless, this small number can 
still dominate a transnational discourse involving thousands of readers, 
through the volume of their posts, the exaggerated effect of their discourse, 
and a common repertoire of targets, repeated accusations, and shared 
humour. Those of us who have blocked trolls must still engage with the 
impact of their discourse.  
 
It is vital to separate legitimate dissent and even combative debate, from 
trolling as a subversion of cultural consensus. Trolls seek to dominate 
discourse by any means necessary, to only be seen to win an apparently fair 
argument whose true terms of engagement are reset at will by the trolls alone 
(Phillips, 2015). But their aim is also to produce a cultural discourse marked 
indelibly by confusion and ambivalence, one in which the only recognisable 
consensus is the fast-moving, volatile in-group humour of the trolls 
themselves, and their ever-shifting list of targets.  
 
From small groups of semi-coordinated trolling activists, to secretly-funded, 
algorithmically-driven campaigns of fake news (Hendricks and Vestergaard, 
2019), the combination of misinformation and the distorted amplification of 
 
2 As this is an open access journal, and thus indexed by search engines, I have 
decided not to increase the reach of trolls by naming them in the main text. 
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reach is now an established social media strategy for activists from all sides of 
political debate. Trolling can be monetised, automated, and translated into 
political soft power. “Trolls are in many ways [now] the grinning poster 
children for the socially networked world” (Phillips, 2015). 
 
Anonymity and dissociation 
 
Whilst most yoga trolling happens from accounts associated with public 
identities, the most libellous trolling is often pseudonymous. A number of 
researchers have examined the effect of anonymity on disinhibiting behaviour 
online. It engenders a disruption of authority in which trolls see themselves as 
independent pioneers “in a make-believe dimension” (Suler, 2004), engaged 
in the generation of “schism, confusion and ambivalence” (Thomassen, 2013). 
Pseudonymous online identities combine with the liminal affect of online 
spaces, to obscure motives and misrepresent the relative socio-political power 
of both troll and target.  
 
‘John Timbers’ was co-creator of the ‘Yoga and Research Movement 
Community’ parody group above. The ‘John Timbers’ name is not only active 
on social media, it was also the name of an account on the blogging site, 
Medium. That account repeated the most common trolling accusations in a 
format impersonating traditional editorial journalism. Other trolls linked to 
those posts on social media, legitimising the misinformation further. ‘John 
Timbers’ is also strongly rumoured to be an alternative account for the online 
identity that set up ‘The Yoga Show’. If this rumour is true, it is worth noting 
that he and his partner created the ‘Boycott Yoga Alliance’ page, and have 
been responsible for most of the content posted on it, including posts by ‘John 
Timbers’. All these online identities position themselves as anti-corporate 
rebels fighting the increasing corporatisation of contemporary yoga. Yet the 
aforementioned partner is a commercially-successful yoga teacher who has 
modelled for major fitness brands (Davis, 2015). Most recently, she appeared 
on a podcast for the most successful London yoga chain, TriYoga (see 2019f). 
In it she makes no reference to her personal involvement in an extensive 
pattern of trolling activism, instead claiming to have reduced her involvement 
with Facebook because it is “very, very argumentative” (Priest, 2018). 
 
Even apparently transparent online identities can therefore involve significant 
pretence. Many of those who defend ‘traditional’ yoga from ‘white yoga 
teachers’ use Sanskrit names and abstract profile images to deflect from the 
fact that they are also white and American. One such account responded to 
my clarification of the ‘post-lineage’ term four months after it was posted 
with the following comment: 
 
How ironic, stating citation is important for your made up term, but citing a 
lineage is not. (In the comment thread of Wildcroft, 2018a). 
 
A common demand made of public figures like me is that we provide 
evidence of our direct connection to a yoga lineage. This commenter went on 
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to claim that all “white yoga teachers” were appropriating yoga, yet she 
herself is a white American yoga teacher. Her Facebook account however 
displays her name as “Devī Bhaktānanda” (see Westbrook, 2019). In the 
religious memetics of yoga-related social media, Sanskrit names mark white 
practitioners as anointed by direct contact with an Indian lineage. For a small 
minority, they are thus proof against the taint of cultural appropriation. This 
holds true even when the name in question has been conferred by a white 
teacher. Yet purity and contamination form an unstable vector for 
determining religious power (Varga, 2005). It is the inherent vulnerability of 
such sanctified status that fuels the search for post-lineage heretics to attack 
on social media, and so a Sanskrit name can sanctify trolling behaviours as a 
form of ongoing inoculation against more accusations of cultural 
appropriation. Even Indians and diasporic Hindus who depart from the chain 
of lineage can be accused of internalising their own colonial oppression. And 
in a significant number of the combative encounters on yoga-related social 
media, both sides consider themselves to be engaged in challenging white 
supremacists in the name of purity and tradition.  
 
The resulting widespread dissociation of religious and professional identities 
is amplified by the “objectification, selective attachment, and pervasive self-
involvement” of social media (Phillips, 2015). Pseudonymous tricksters 
generate actually libellous material without fear of legal reprisals. This 
material is propagated by other trolls whilst denying responsibility for its 
truth. Other online identities replicate material accusations to prove their own 
sincerity. Some of these identities are operated by the same people. The reach 
of a troll is amplified with each new identity assumed, and each time 
misinformation is shared, and each time, the humanity of trolling targets is 
accordingly diminished. Trolling targets are the source material for a 
pedagogical moment in which all concerned can demonstrate their intellectual 
and ethical superiority to others. 
 
Original sin and intellectual dishonesty 
 
In such cases trolling meets ‘call-out culture’: a form of contemporary social 
media discourse in which any speech act considered to be oppressive, is 
called out, preferably by ‘allies’ rather than the marginalised group affected 
by the prohibited speech. In response to a ‘call-out’ the accused, as the one 
supposedly holding the most privilege, should always apologise unreservedly 
(Serano, 2013). Addressing the implicit bias in shared cultural spaces is 
obviously important. But evidently, when online identities are often 
pseudonymous to varying degrees, masking one’s own level of socio-political 
privilege and distorting that of one’s target, is an effective strategy to 
dominate debate by invoking a subcultural call-out on one’s own, or another’s 
behalf. 
 
Call-outs are intrinsically performative, and often collective. They allow white 
yoga practitioners a short-term opportunity to artificially resolve their own 
perceived complicity in cultural appropriation through a public 
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demonstration of ‘allyship’. The effect is inflected by familiar tropes of sin, 
confession, and righteous retribution. In practice, those who most succeed at 
this form of performative expiation are not the most marginalised of groups. 
They are instead the most articulate, and those with the leisure time and 
access to keep up with current memes and target issues. Above all, to take 
most profitable advantage from trolling and call-out culture in transnational 
yoga, one must have intimate knowledge of the North American cultural 
landscape. In light of this, both trolling and call-out culture are themselves a 
form of American cultural imperialism, and one whose ontology is thus 
unsurprisingly Protestant:  
 
White privilege is the secular white person’s Original Sin, present at birth and 
ultimately ineradicable. One does one’s penance by endlessly attesting to this 
privilege in hope of some kind of forgiveness. (McWhorter, 2018). 
 
A significant minority of the minor players in trolling and call-outs also 
happen to be graduate students, working on yoga-related dissertations. These 
educated, and almost always white, American women maintain intimate 
knowledge of yoga-related social media for their own research purposes. A 
significant minority share trolling material targeting other scholars, and add 
‘likes’ and ‘laughing’ emoji responses. Again, by calling-out another’s ‘white 
supremacy’, such early-career researchers seek to inoculate their own work 
from accusations of cultural appropriation. In an increasingly competitive 
career climate, it is worth speculating on the many ways in which trolling 
tactics can be leveraged to professional advantage. At the height of this 
episode of trolling, a number of such graduate students made public demands 
to ‘audit’ my work to assess whether the accusations of trolls were correct, or 
made offers to ‘collaborate’ on articles. It is reasonable to presume that at least 
some of these students were keen to gain access to as-yet unpublished output 
from a rival scholar, and some wished to increase their own reach and 
engagement through connection to my own success. All would have 
confirmed their own emic status and thus access to yoga-related discourse by 
joining the debate, even if their demands or offers were refused.  
 
As I discovered, scholars whose work has been misappropriated become 
subject to Brandolini’s Law of bullshit (sic) asymmetry: “the amount of energy 
needed to refute bullshit is an order of magnitude bigger than to produce it”. 
The ease with which social media enables the separation of content from 
creator only increases this asymmetry. “More often than not, content 
functions as the visual equivalent of a sound bite” (Phillips, 2015), too easily 
separated from its context, and shared. In my own case, refuting or clarifying 
every time the term ‘post-lineage’ was mis-cited in confusion or malice was 
impossible. More hopefully, I have found that increased subcultural 
engagement in-person, at conferences and yoga teacher trainings, appears to 
be a slow and intensive corrective to social media misinformation.  
 
There is as yet no robust data detailing the effect of trolling on yoga-related 
scholarship. Anecdotally and according to private correspondence, many of 
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those targeted either maintain a list of ‘blocked’ accounts, or have severely 
restricted their social media engagement. Some have closed their personal 
accounts. A few maintain a second profile on which to regularly monitor 
trolling activities. This is essential in cases where trolls have threatened to 
organise public boycotts of yoga studios, conferences and university events 
that host people they are targeting. As more experienced yoga scholars told 
me, anonymously: 
 
[This] can have (and maybe is already having) a dire effect on scholarship, 
both at a personal and institutional level. […] Increasingly, people turn to 
private money to pursue their research, or to keep their job. In India-related 
subjects, this money may come from […] people [who] have a huge stake in 
destroying western Indology. 
 
Careers have been affected and some have been placed on ‘scholar at risk’ 
lists after threats to their lives. I know of one scholar who is said to have 
abandoned his former area of research. 
 
Persuasion architectures and algorithmic intelligence 
 
Whilst some trolling is inherently anarchic and amoral, most coordinated 
trolling in yoga-related spaces involves ‘digital vigilantism’. Digital 
vigilantism is encouraged by the structures of peer surveillance embedded in 
social media platforms, and “occurs in a cultural context where users are 
coming to terms with the relation between online activity and offline 
consequences” (Trottier, 2017). Rumours on WhatsApp fuel mob violence in 
India (Sushma, 2017). Female writers attract violent threats on Twitter (Jane, 
2015). Alt-right activists ‘dox’ investigating journalists (Wilson, 2018b).  
 
Trolls involved in digital vigilantism prefer targets that reinforce a polarised 
moral code against the ambiguity of online space, re-inscribing a common 
axiological circle around the subculture with the trolling target on the outside. 
That reinforced morality comes at an expense. The battle for authority and 
accountability detailed in this article provokes an increasing slippage between 
fact, propaganda and parody. It transforms consensus reality concerning the 
history, science, and philosophies of yoga into an ever more mutable, 
contested resource. Even the trolls themselves are often exhausted by the 
process. Parody groups, activist pages and pseudonymous accounts 
frequently become dormant after a few months or years, to be replaced by 
others. 
 
The medium of choice for yoga trolling is Facebook, a platform embedded in 
multiple areas of our online lives, making porous the boundaries between 
professional activities, personal attachments and social activism. It is also an 
arena in which users are encouraged to respond to any post with heightened 
affect. Reaction emojis encourage users to like or love, hate or be amazed by 
the content of others, but not to be thoughtful or unsure. Almost all social 
media platforms reward prolific engagement by users, and encourage users to 
insert themselves into conversations without appropriate context clues. As a 
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result, social media discourse is commonly dominated by the most polarised 
intent, the most emotive prose, and the most prolific sharers of content. Even 
as platform founders publicly condemn trolling and vigilantism, social media 
continues to alter the consensus protocols of human interaction, offline as well 
as on.  
 
Some analyses of social media behaviour call for better community 
moderation or legal intervention (Phillips, 2015). This ignores the fact that the 
community-building activity that social media platforms claim to promote is 
not their main purpose. Such platforms are instead ‘persuasion architectures’ 
(Tufekci, 2017), designed independent of considerations of harm or evidential 
truth. They are optimised not for increasing the sum of human knowledge or 
fellow feeling, but for addiction and obfuscation. Their financial survival 
depends on producing an enormous amount of social data to be monetised 
and manipulated by corporate and governmental actors. This necessitates 
deep surveillance and the development of artificially intelligent systems to 
manage that data. Many of the algorithms governing social media have 
unexpected and anti-social side effects (Wilson, 2018a). And some of the most 
vocal accounts dominating social media discourse may not even correspond 
to human identities. “Facebook estimate[s] that as many as 60 million bots 
may be infesting its platform” (Lazer et al., 2018). The VR pioneer Jaron 
Lanier has also warned about the unforeseeable effects of combining 
persuasion-based social media with increasingly immersive technologies: 
 
The rhetoric from the companies is […] that what they’re really doing […] is 
building the giant global brain that’ll inherit the earth and they’ll upload you 
to that brain and then you won’t have to die. […] And so it’s turning into this 
new religion, and it’s a religion […] that’s completely lacking in empathy or 
any kind of personal acknowledgment. (Kulwin, 2018) 
 
Towards a new axiology of the internet 
 
Here at the conclusion of my PhD I have fifty online identities blocked on 
Facebook, yet sporadic news of more trolling still reaches me. Any new 
mention of my work on social media could provoke a further wave of attacks. 
Any scholar of religion could be next to encounter the same situation.  
 
Fake news is evolving into a highly politicised, organised form of 
misinformation (Lazer et al., 2018). Trolling increasingly dominates online 
political discourse, leveraging existing socio-political dynamics to divide 
communities and delegitimise marginalised voices (Phillips, 2015). Human 
actors on social media are manipulated by algorithms beyond the control of 
their creators (Tufekci, 2017). Ontological security is an inequitably 
distributed resource (Rossdale, 2015) that can be bought at the price of 
filtering out debate (Nanda, 2005). In language at least, we continue to divide 
contemporary culture into ‘online’ and ‘real world’ spheres. Scholars, 
technologists and policy makers still largely act as if social media discourse is 
adjacent to ‘real’ culture. Academic institutions are left unprepared when the 
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tools of public engagement are weaponised against scholarship itself. Whilst 
numerous policy documents have been written on the importance of 
measuring the impact of research via social media, I have found none 
addressing the growing impact of social media on research in turn. 
Meanwhile democracies stumble, and the ideal of negotiated, consensus 
reality that guides academic knowledge production and the mutual social 
contract is contested. 
 
Nonetheless, as a researcher of contemporary yoga practice, I know that 
behaviours common in yoga-related social media spaces would still be 
unthinkable in the yoga studio or shala, where students and teachers alike are 
conditioned by a strong culture of respect. Through bodily co-presence, 
civilised behaviour is entrained into habitus (Mellor and Shilling, 2010). Yet 
our online spaces are not disembodied. The use of social media in particular is 
governed by pre-civilised limbic instincts more than mental processes 
(Tufekci, 2017). The disinhibition and amplified effect of social media are 
connected to both the uncertainty of online spaces, and the addictiveness of 
platform architectures. But do they also show us how, unmoored from the 
established cultural protocols governing the meeting of physical bodies, our 
minds are freer to act out the impulses of our most primitive physical 
reflexes? 
 
Beyond any resources we might develop to help keep both individual 
academics, and the academy itself safe online, we are in need of cultural, not 
just technological solutions. What can anthropological understandings of 
axiological development suggest to formalise our online connections into 
assumptions of dignity and civility? Could there be an online equivalent of 
the handshake, built into our greetings with strangers? And could such rituals 
help us to imagine an animism of the internet, where one can be capable of 
the feat of imagination that is recognising the dignity of another sentient, 
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